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Transformational generative grammarians have maintained the belief for
some time now that language is so complex that it cannot be learned. This
argument, in some cases, is based on incorrect argumentation, in which it is
pre-empted by the use of more adequate models of linguistic processing,
including Chomsky's own model. As a result, his argument is not valid; it
does not prove what he insists that it does. When viewed from a more
adequate perspective, language is not as complex as Chomsky says that it is.
Besides these arguments, there is also the possibility that the Chomskyan
üew of language, arising out of the Aristotelian philosophical tradition,
makes language appear to be excessively complex. An alternative üew of
language would accord well with connectionism (Parallel Distributed
Processing - - PDP) which offers a model of language or psychology as a
mechanism for language learning quite different from üe Classical view
present in Western societies from the earliest times to üe present. Thus, if
the transformationalist view of language is incorrect and language is not as
complex as it may seem from the transformationalist üewpoint and if the
connectionist view of language has a measure of truth in it, then language
is, in fact, more simple -- probably simple enough to be learned.
It has been the case for some time now that transformational generative
theoreticians have seen language as being so complex that it cannot be
Iearned. Thus Hornstein and Lightfoot (1981:9) state that "...the child
attains the complex system fof language] despite a deficiency of data... " So,
too, Moore and Carling (1987: 15) state:
To explain the knowledge of such a complex property as the binding of
reciprocal expressions that children attain, the argument mns, we need to assume
that the child's initial state consists of an innate, intricate and highly restrictive
schematism of some sort.
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Thus also Kronenfield (1979: 217) writes about "The complexity of the
structure of language which Chomsky has described... " This should not be
surprising since, as Sampson (1980a:147) points out, "...Chomsky... is a
rationalist in the tradition of Plato and Descartes, who believes that the
mind is a thing of highly complex fixed structure which largely dctermines
the form of human mental activity..." The question then arises: Just how
complex is language? It is apparent from a survey of the literature that
there are no objective measures of the complexity of languages, but,
nevertheless, it can be shorvn that language is not as complex as most
transformationalists assert it to be.
Thus, the attempt here will be made to illustrate the belief that
Chomskyan argumentation and use of evidence for theory buil«ling make
natural language appear excessively complex. Commentators such as
Slama-Cazacu have intimated as much when they say: "To try to posit
differences in syntactic structure for each possible interpretatic,n of every
sentence is to introduce into the syntactic description distinctions which
are completely foreign to the language in question." (Cited from
Uhlenbeck, r.d., p. 12. For an early statement of this concept, see
Uhlenbeck, r.d., p.55). As a result, the first section of this essay will
attempt to show that language is not as complex as Chomskyans say that it
is while assuming the positions held by Chomsky and his followers. The
second section will attempt to do so by showing the essential incorrectness
of the Chomskyan position.
One of the arguments that Chomsky adduces for his view that language
is extremely complex has to do with the extraction of auxiliaries from
sentences with WH-clauses in the formation of yes-no questions. This
argument is formulated in Chomsky (1980: 39) in the following terms:
Consider the process of formation of simple yes-or-no questions in English.
We have such declarative-questions pairs as(1):
(1) The man is here -- Is the man here?
The man will leave --Will the man leave?
Consider the two hypotheses put forth to account for this infinite class of pairs:
Hl: process the declarative from beginning to end (left to right), word by word,
until reaching the first occurrence of the words is, will. etc.; transPose this
occurrence to the beginning (left), forming the first noun phrase of the
associated interrogative.
H2: same as Hl, but select the first occurrence of is, uill, etc., following the first
noun phrase ofthe declarative.
He then goes on to show how HI is not correct for pairs such as those
at (2):
The man who is here is tall. -- Is the man who is here tall?
The man who is tall will leave. --Will the man who is tall leave?
(2)
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After this, he proceeds to argue that H2 is more nearly correct and to
picture the child as some sort of linguistic genius for being able to deter-
mine this. The argument then is that language is so complex at this point
that it cannot be learned from the evidence; it must be determined by
neurological structures. Therefore, the child's ability to use and
understand language is innate. But even if this is true, as Seidenberg
(1994: 392) points out, "...networks can learn to solve problems in the face
of inconsistent training." Therefore, irregularity in the thing to be learned
does not prove that it is innate. (See also Hacker ( 1990: 142).)
The curious thing about the Chomskyan argument, however, is that,
for its effectiveness, it relies on a left-to-right, linear (serial) processing
model by Chomsky's own admission, in his words, "...process... from
beginning to end (left to right), word by word..." (1980: 39). The reason
that this is such a curiosity is üat very few, if any, serious linguists or
language theorists (Robertson et al. 1993) in the twentieth cenhrry have
put forward a linear processing model as capable of describing language.
The argument is even more curious since Chomsky himself does not
adhere to a linear processing model in his theorizing about language. The
transformational generative grammar model is hierarchically organized,
utilizing concepts such as the transformational cycle, d-structure and s-
structure and the ordering of transformational or movement rules. Further,
both he and his followers suggest that his model is psychologically real, that
is, it models the human brain and/or neurological processes. (See, for
instance, Pritchett (1991: 253).)
Now, if, in fact, hierarchically organized models do best describe
language and if, in fact, information is hierarchically organized in the
brain, then the difficulty of extracting the correct auxiliary for the
production of the yes-no question in (2) is non-existent. In such a model,
the auxiliary could quite well be extracted for both the sentences at (1) and
at (2) in the same manner. The embedding of the relative clauses at (2)
could come after the extraction of the auxiliary in some sense of the word
or another. This kind of a model can be illustrated by a diagrammatic
schema of the following type.
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(The above diagrams are similar to those used in a conventional
Chomskyan model; however, they are amended to show the extraction of
the auxiliary in both instances -- (A) and (B).) It should be apparent that if
a top to bottom processing is used in conjunction with a right-toJeft
processing, extraction of the correct auxiliary is no more difficult in
sentence (A) -- Chomsky's(1) -than in sentence (B) --Chomsky's (2). And
Chomsky is in error to say that üey are different. He can only make his
claim by using a left to right, linear processing model. Since the cliagrams,
(A) and (B), and the statementwhich precedes them represent models of
neural organization and abstract entities which are manipulated in the
brain, they are thus adequate models in the sense that Mendelian law is an
adequate model for describing transmission of genetic characteristics from
one generation to the next. For this reason, Chomsky's argument is pre-
empted by the use of more adequate models of linguistic pr:ocessing,
including his own model. His argument is not valid; it does not prove what
he insists that it does. When viewed from an adequate perspective,
language is not as complex as Chomsky says that it is.
Similar statements can be made about other arguments from syntax
that Chomsky (1980:40) uses to support his belief that language is
excessively complex and cannot be learned. For instance, he looks at the
pair of sentences at (4) and (5) and concludes that they are nearly
synonymous.
(4) Each of the men likes the others.
(5) The men like each other
He then looks at the sentences at (6) and (7) and is surprised that the
condition of near synonymity does not hold for them.
(6) Each of the men expectsJohn to like the others
(7) The men expectJohn to like the others.
Again, Chomsky's argumentation is curious. The curiosity stems from
the fact that Chomsky ostensibly adheres to the autonomous syntax
position - -a hlpothesis which forces a cleavage between semantics and
syntax. (See Chomsky 1965: 226, note 15 and 1975:41-42, 82.) In this
argumentation, he is arguing largely from semantics, that is, his argument
relies on the fact that the meaning of (4) and (5) is somewhat similar but
the meaning of sentences (6) and (7) is quite different. The difficulty with
the argumentation from these examples does not stem completely from the
fact that Chomsky is not faithful to his presuppositional base, however. The
difficulty stems from the fact that Chomsky tries to find patterns where
there are none; he groups things which are entirely different from each
other and then finds that the relationships among the dissimilar entities
are very complex. And since they are complex, he says that they cannot be
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learned. They must be innate. This can be seen by the fact that, in the first
place, sentences (4) and (5) are not all that similar in meaning. In (4) the
plural of othn has a collective meaning; each of the men like the other
men as a group. In (5) the meaning of plurality associated with othn is
distributive; each of the men like the other men as individuals. In the
second place, sentences (4) and (5) are syntactically quite different and
should not be treated as though they are similar. In (4) , each is in
construction with of and signals what at one time was known as a partitive
construction. In (5), each functions as a determiner with the noun, men. ln
the third place, verbs like expect are not transparent in the sense that the
meaning of the subject 'sees through' to the predicate. Happen and seems
are verbs like this: It seerns that John lifus Mary / John seerns to like Mary. But
expect is not a verb of this type. Chomsky's attempt to force it into this
category produces the complexity that he finds. In short, there is no reason
at all to compare sentences (4) and (5) with sentences (6) and (7) or to
compare sentences such as (6) and (7) with sentences such as (8) The men
heard, stories about each other. They are completely different and their
comparisou throws no light on the structure of English whatsoever. For
these reasons, Chomsky's argumentation is simply incorrect and language
is not as complex as he would maintain. The complexity is caused by the
fact that Chomsky tries to find patterns where there are none; he groups
things which are entirely different from each other and then finds that the
relationships among the dissimilar entities are very complex.
In another of his works, Chomsky (1975:101) pursues the same kind of
argumentation. He finds it surprising that sentence (8) (Chomsky's 29) is
ungrammatical but that sentence (8') (Chomsky's 29') is grammatical.
9
(8)
(8')
*it seems to us that Bill likes each other.
it seems to each of us that Bill likes the others.
He says that there is "...no semantic reason..."*hy the sentence at (8)
"...should not have the same meaning..." as the sentence at (B'). This may
be so. But there is a syntactic reason why they do not have the same
meaning. The embedded sentence at (8) is ungrammatical: Bill likes each
other and it also makes no sense whatsoever; that is, it cannot satisff
pragmatic rules for any situation in the knowable world. But the embedded
sentence at (8') is grammatical and it makes good sense: Bill likes the others.
Why Chomsky should compare groups of words that simply have the same
lexical tokets: each and other, Bill and likq and expect them to have
semantic and syntactic similarities is simply curious. It is not only curious; it
is incorrect argumentation since he ostensibly holds to the autonomous
syntax position but looks at the meaning of individual words, lumped
together in odd orders, and expects to come out with sensible conclusions.
It is no wonder, then, that English syntax to him seems to be mysteriously
complex and requires that he formulate the innateness hypothesis to
explain how it is learned.
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This leads to the kind of evidence that Chomsky uses to support his
theory building. For example, he uses the following sentence as a
grammatical sentence:
(9) Here is the student that my attempt to talk to scared to death.
(Chomsky 1982: 44).
Now, it is possible to create such a 'sentence' and even to uuderstand
it. But it is the contention here that such a sentence would neve¡: occur in
natural conversation and hence when it is used as evidence, the evidence is
spurious. Similarly, sets of sentences such as the following exist only in
various wri rings of transformational grammarians:
(10) a. I forget who filed every article without reading it.
b. I forget who filed which article without reading it.
(Chomsky 1982:44)
(11) a. Not to seem happy is a prerequisite for Writing Novels.
b. *To seem not happy is a prerequisite for Writing Novels.
Pollock's (22a) (1989: 376).
Requiring the grammar to distinguish benveen sets of sentences such
as these, which are probably not a part of natural language use in any case
in that they probably have never occurred in English, makes the grammar
unnecessarily complex. It also creates the üew that language is excessively
complex. Similarly, the grammatical judgements in the sentences at (11)
seem incorrect; the fwo sentences are equally grammatical or un-
grammatical.
(11) a. Not to seem happy is a prerequisite for Writing Novels.
b. *To seem not happy is a prerequisite for Writing Novels.
Pollock's (22a) (1989: 376).
Attempting to have the grammar of English discriminate between
sentences such as (lla) and (1lb) makes the grammar excessively
complex.
Besides these arguments, there is also the possibility that the
Chomskyan view of language, arising out of the Aristotelian philosophical
tradition, makes language appear to be excessively complex. In particular,
it is possible to look at a phrase from natural language such as The shooting
of the hunters and to parse the sentence so that in one reading the noun,
huntns, is subject and in another reading the noun, huntns, is object. (The
example is from Chomsky (1957:88).) But the question is üis: Do native
speakers when they encounter the language in its natural state, that is,
within the context of situation or within the context of a written or spoken
discourse, parse the sentence prior to uttering or understanding it? The
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answer to the question is: Probably not. Antal has commented on this
stating:
'Disambiguation' almost never occurs in the everyday practise of the native
speaker and hearer. The speaker generally 'knows' what he wants to say and
formulates his speech according to his intended message. While speaking he
doesn't 'select' one interpretation from among several, but he uses the most
obvious one in order to achieve his goal, usually without the faintest idea of other
possible interpretations of the sentence which he happens to use
momentaneously (1989: 349). (See also Tabossi and Zardon 1993.)
Similarly, experimentation by psychologists during the 60's and early
70's could not demonstrate the existence of transformational processes or
the fact that native speakers, in some sense or other, parsed sentences in
their attempt to process the meaning in them. As Wilks (1987: 198) has
stated "...psychological experiment has consistently failed to confirm the
reality of the structures Chomsky has predicted. ..."
In support of this, consider the following: What if the Aristotelian
tradition has simply led generations of grammarians and linguists to look at
language in an incorrect fashion? Although it is possible to analyze the
phrase The shooting of the huntns so that in one reading the noun, huntrq is
subject and in another reading the noun, hunterc, is object, is it necessary to
do so? [n any natural environment, the speaker/hearers know intuitively
who is doing the shooting and who is being shot. Perhaps, language simply
provides rather inexact symbols to which language users attach meaning
which they infer from the context of situation or from the context of a
written or spoken discourse and the meanings 'subject of , 'object of , etc.
are not to be found in the concatenations of the verbal symbols at all.
Uhlenbeck (n.d. p. 28) is very close to formulating such a concept when he
discusses the very topic and points out that The shooting of the sold.ins is
ambiguous in a 'reciprocal' reading versus a non-reciprocal reading,
whereas The shooting of the soldier is not. He also points out that the
ambiguity of the reading cannot be attributed to the plural because th.e The
shooting of the gang is ambiguous in the same way that The shooting of the
sol.diers is. He goes even further to suggest that The broikng of the duck would
not normally be read with duck as the subject of broil but it could be read
this way if the duck under discussion was a mythical hero in a fairy tale.
Thus the meaning inherent in any collocation of language items would be
attributable to the meaning derived from the context of situation or from
the context of a written or spoken discourse and not from notions of
'subject', 'object', 'agent', 'instrument', 'noun', and 'verb' inherently
attached to collocations of lexical items. In this sense also, the meanings of
'subject', 'object', 'agent', 'instrument', 'noun', and 'verb' would be de-
rived indirectly from the context also.
Such a view of language would accord well with more recent üews of
language such as that of the connectionists (Parallel Distributed Processing
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--PDP). The reason for this is that connectionism provides for computer
simulation of learning, including language learning, through the scanning
of input and the adjustment of 'weighs' in 'networks' until the desired
output is achieved. In the words of Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988:6)
connectionist "...networks can be made to learn; this is achieved by
modifring the weights on the connections as a function of certain kinds of
feedback..." To accomplish this simulation of learning connectionists start
with ill-defined units which are modified in the networks. As a result,
connectionism (PDP) does not utilize the notion of rules governing
specific units; it rather changes the notion of "rule" to "lawful" or a
generalization of series of connections or associations over a number of
connections. In terms of Rumelhart and McClelland, two of the principal
proponents of associationism, language is not a "rule-governed"
phenomenon. They state (1987: 196):
In our network models, the mechanisms that process language are constructed in
such a way that there are no rules anywhere in them. Acquisition occurs by a
simple process of adjusting connections between units. The behavior of the
models is lawful (as la*ful, we would argue, as the human behavior it simulates),
but it is not based on the formulation or consultation of rules.
Thus, according to üem, although language is not "rulegoverned", it
is "larful" like other forms of human behavior.
Gasser expands this notion in a series of rhetorical questions:
What if the adult 'grammar' is not a neat one after all? What if the best
characterization of adult 'performance' is one quite unlike the idealized picture
that generative theory would have us believe in? Once we are willing to accept the
possibility of an adult system in which redundancy is rampant, concepts are fluid,
metaphor is a fundamental process, and exceptions are the rule, our picture of
the learner and our research strategy change dramatically. Rather ttran focusing
on innate constraints, our work seeks powerful ways of exracting regularities
from the input. Using these techniques, learners are free to examine the input
and decide for themselves whether and where lines are to be drawn. (1990: 196)
In any case, because of the nature of connectionism, language is not
viewed as composed of units with properties inhering in them, a view which
results in the view of language as rule-governed; rather, language is
composed of units which change given the nature of the input.
At this point, it might be interesting to speculate on recent debates
about whether meanings are precisely fixed onto linguistic items. These
debates usually take an all-or-none form with commentators such as Harris
(1981: 155) and Sampson (1980b: 48, 68) insisting that they are not and
those such as Pateman (1987), that they are. The point here would be that
they are precisely fixed for certain contexts, but they are not for others.
Thus, in the context of a cattle ranch the phonological form of The sons
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raise nxeat would mean one thing; in the context of a sunrise, The sun's rays
mcet, would mean quite another thing. And the phonological form/reyz/
would function at one time as a noun and another time as a verb. Their
behavior is lawful but neither 'noun-ness" nor 'verb-ness' inhere in the
lexical item/reyz/and cannot be predicated by rule in the Chomskyan
sense. The same could be said of 'Time flies', which in a discussion of how
time passes means one thing and, in a discussion of the speed of racing
insects in a mythical story, would mean quite another - -the response to the
firstwould be, 'It does, doesn't it' and to the second, would be'I can't; they
go too fast.'In the first, time is a noun, an abstractentity; in the second, it
is a verb, used to express action. In the first, flies is a verb, used to express a
kind of motion; in the second, it is a noun, in the plural, used as a name for
an insect. Form, function and meaning in language come together only in
the context of situation or the context of discourse. When the context
changes, the form, function and meaning all change together. Only a
system such as the one postulated by connectionists can easily
accommodate this fact. Pulling language out of context and trying to
puzzle through descriptions of it out of context is a useless endeavor which
changes the study of language into the study of abstract tokens bearing
little or no resemblance to the thing studied. It also makes language appear
more complex than it really is.
Thus it is that, in the context of situation, none of the participants who
understand that context need a theory of government and binding or tra-
ces that index pronouns or similar mechanisms to comprehend the
sentence:
(12) John knows who gave it to him
The tokens in the utterance are sufficiently vague to allow meaning to
be attached to the lexical items which then allow the function and the form
to follow along. If a participant were to come late to a conversation in
which such a sentence were used and not understand the situation, then
that individual would have to ask:
(13) Who gave what to whom?
But traces, theta-roles and empty categories do not help in the
understanding of the utterance; the context does that either in the form of
the situation or the discourse. Traces, theta-roles and empty categories only
serve to make language appear unnecessarily complex. As Love (1989: 273)
has pointed out: "The point is that speaking and understanding are
activities that are carried on in a real world which is quite unlike the
artificially simplified world of the experimental laboratory." And it might
be added, speaking and hearing do not go on in the artificial laboratory of
the linguist whose every sentence is the creation of an active brain in the
laboratory situation, not in the real world, "...an ideal speaker hearer in a
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completely homogeneous speech community" (Chomsky 1965: 6).
Language is a social fact, "...rules, constituting conventions l-o which
existing speakers are party..." (Love 1989: 278. See also Itkonen 1978).
The great innovation of connectionist devices is that PDP permits
digital devices to function as analog devices and thus makes them more
adaptable to the assignment of meanings in context and, consequently, to
the fuzziness of sets which are so characteristic of language (Love
1989:280-281). As Eikmeyer and Rieser have shown: "... meanings are
not fixed objects of any sort, they are fuzzy, flexible and open to ad-justment...." (See also Rieger (1981:195).) And as a result, the form and
function of linguistic items change depending upon their meaning and
use. It is no wonder then that "...natural language categories, such as noun
phrase, clause, etc. ... are fuzzy and that rules of grammar do not simply
apply or fail to apply,but apply with more or less'strengü'..." (Ross as
quoted in Lakoff 1982:154). Thus it is that connectionist (PDP) systems
are more adept at modeling natural language. As Clark (1989: 1J0) poins
out:
The power of PDP systems to shade meanings across a whole continuum of cases
enables them to model a number of effects. Most straightforwardly,, it enables
them to disambiguate words according to the context built up by the rest of the
sentence.
Such a system, since it can accommodate the notion of 'context',
makes language appear more simple than other competing language
models.
Furüermore, since PDP models generate or produce both the irregu-
lar and regular forms of language from a single spe of model, the view that
they give of language appears less complex from that of competing views.
Seidenberg (1993: 234) says that connectionism (PDP) changes the way we
think. Connectionism encodes "...both rule-governed cases and exceptions
to the rules." Similarly, as Pinker and Prince (1988:73) admit:
Rumelhart and McClelland have described a connectionist (parallel distributed
processing) model of the acquisition of the past tense in English which
successfully maps many stems onto their past tense forms, both regrilar (walh/
walked) and irregular (go/went ), and which mimics some of the errors and
sequences of development of children.
Certainly, such a system produces a view of language which is less
complex than a system which must have rules to describe the regularities of
language and a lexicon for the listing of irregularities. It turns out üat üe
PDP models not only give a more adequate view of how a single mechanism
can account for both regular and irregular forms, but it also accounts for
errors üat children make in learning the language and errors made by
aphasics. Clark (1989: 169) argues the latter point in the following fashion:
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...imagine a kind of damage that decremens ¿/l the connecti!'ity strengths by 10
per cent. This could move all the irregular words below the threshold rvhile
leaving the originally strong regular pattern functional.
Certainly, a view of language produced through a single mechanism
that can account for errors of children increasing their use of language and
aphasics involved with decrements of language usage, to say nothing of a
system which can account for 'shades of meaning' or the construcüon of
ambiguiries, on the one hand, and metaphors, on the other, sees language
as not being extraordinarily complex.
So it is, then, that language viewed through the eyes of a transfor-
mationalist is excessively complex, too complex to be learned in any
meaningful sense of the word. But it can be shown that the trans-
formationalist's view of the complexity of language is marred by incorrect
argumentation and it is also marred by incorrect use of evidence. Further,
the transformationalist view of language may be incorrect. If this is so and if
the connectionist view of language has a measure of truth, then language
is, in fact, more simple --probably simple enough to be learned. And since
this is so, then, "...it is possible to bring back more emphasis on teaching,/
learning in second language acquisition theory since connectionism
focuses on learning... (Shirai and Yap 1993: 127)."
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